Se presenta una propuesta de innovación educativa, dirigida al alumnado de Educación Secundaria, fundamentada en el uso de los itinerarios didácticos teatralizados como recurso didáctico con perspectiva de género. Para su confección se pretende una metodología que privilegia los contenidos procedimentales y que fomenta el pensamiento histórico y, por ende, el pensamiento crítico. Los contenidos seleccionados están relacionados con el siglo XVI y XVII y, más concretamente, con la persecución y procesamiento de mujeres por brujería y hechicería por parte del (...) Tribunal de la Inquisición. Para ello se toma como centro de estudio el proceso que se llevó a cabo en Córdoba contra Leonor Rodríguez, lo que llevará al alumnado a reflexionar y a preguntarse sobre los estereotipos de la mujer en la historia, así como en la actualidad, con la intención de formar a una ciudadanía crítica y comprometida. (shrink)

Collaborative economy emerged as a response to the need of people to exchange, produce and share in a more humane and cooperative manner. However, the growth of collaborative economy organizations and the terminological confusion have led to debates about their possible effects, both positive and negative. In this study, we have created a guideline that can be used to evaluate the contribution of organizations considered within collaborative economy to common good. We used the conceptualization of common good, which, from its (...) Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, was developed by the personalist-humanist perspective of management. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the evaluation of the contribution of any organization to the common good must take into account how the participants develop their virtues, the creation of the community and its impact on the common good of society. At the end of the article, we present the aspects that society must take into account regarding collaborative economy. Firstly, society, in general, must approach collaborative economy as a tool that must complement others in the search for solutions to economic and social problems and, secondly, the governance of the platform-network is essential to foster organizational models that favour the common good. (shrink)

The most popular work of Francisco Sánchez, Quo nihil scitur (1581), transmits an absolutely sceptic thought. However, other writings like Carmen de Cometa anni M.D.LXXVII (1578), offer us different ideas about how Sánchez considers possible the scientific knowledge like, for example, his idea about the casual relations between natural objects.

En el presente artículo hago un resumen de «Esas Indias equivocadas y malditas» de Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio. La principal idea que desarrolla es que el discurso de los conquistadores, y hasta la actualidad muchos historiadores, legitimaba la conquista de América en nombre de la religión, de la civilización o del progreso; por ello, todo el dolor de las «naciones indias» estaría justificado por su incorporación a la historia universal. A continuación, presento los comentarios hechos por Juan Antonio Ruescas Juárez, (...) María del Mar Ramírez Alvarado y por Francisco Castilla Urbano a ese texto ferlosiano. Finalmente, concluyo con unas reflexiones personales sobre el texto de Sánchez Ferlosio. (shrink)

From the most prominent thinkers in Latin American philosophy, literature, politics, and social science comes a challenge to conventional theories of globalization. The contributors to this volume imagine a discourse in which revolution requires no temporalized march of progress or takeovers of state power but instead aims at local control and the material conditions for human dignity.

Pedro Álvarez (Cuba) y Rafael Trelles (Puerto Rico) son dos importantes exponentes de la plástica contemporánea en el Caribe hispano que encontraron en dos hitos artísticos del siglo xix una vía para cuestionar las fórmulas fijadas por la Historia y el Arte. Ambos, a partir de la reapropiación de la obra de Víctor Patricio Landaluze y Francisco Oller, respectivamente, reflexionan sobre las complejas circunstancias de sus islas. Mediante el estudio del pasado ambos se preocupan comprometidamente por el sentido de (...) su historia patria, por la (re) actualización de su tradición artística o las funciones del intelectual en la configuración de sus contextos nacionales. La fragmentación y el collage resultan métodos constructivos eficaces que utilizan ambos artistas para descontextualizar los múltiples signos culturales de sus referentes de partida y readecuar sus múltiples significados en la nueva obra, y en el nuevo contexto. Sin embargo, a pesar de las semejanzas se advierten igualmente diferencias de intención, de acuerdo a las respectivas realidades nacionales. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Defending a Phenomenological–Behavioral Perspective: Culture, Behavior, and ExperienceMarino Pérez-Álvarez (bio), José M. García-Montes (bio), Adolfo J. Cangas (bio), and Louis A. Sass (bio)KeywordsBehavior, contextual phenomenology, culture, experienceWe should like to express our sincere thanks to all the authors for their commentaries on our articles. Given the restrictions of space (a limitation they too had to contend with), we can only respond to a few aspects of their interesting remarks. (...) We shall reply of course on the basis of our own approach—an approach that sets out to integrate culture, behavior, and experience, and that might be termed contextual phenomenology, phenomenological behaviorism, or perhaps most accurately (albeit more awkwardly), the phenomenological–behavioral perspective.In her commentary, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008), referring to the target articles “Phenomenology and behaviorism” (Pérez-Álvarez, Sass, and Cangas 2008) and “The role of superstition in psychopathology” (García-Montes et al. 2008), wonders whether our maintaining of the spirit of Skinner, as well as our recourse to phenomenology, might not themselves represent forms of superstitious behavior. She points out that it is not always a good idea to put new wine in old barrels. For her, the new wine and new barrels would be represented by social constructivism, of which she is reminded by some aspects of our work. But in making her own case, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) reveals certain common prejudices concerning behaviorism, prejudices that have apparently persisted even after reading our article. Thus, for example, she does not see operant behavior as incorporating intentionality (what, in the target article, is presented in terms of final causality), because she assumes that intentionality would necessarily imply a mentalist and dualist notion involving a supposed internal mental entity that causes behavior. Skinner (1974) himself noted and rejected this very assumption in a passage that clearly distinguishes his own approach from what he calls a “stimulus-response formula”: “Possibly no charge,” he wrote,is more often leveled against behaviorism or a science of behavior than that it cannot deal with purpose or intention. A stimulus-response formula has no answer, but operant behavior is the very field of purpose and [End Page 281] intention. By its nature it is directed toward the future: a person acts in order that something will happen, and the order is temporal.(pp. 55–6)The place Skinner gives to intentionality and purpose is elaborated in our target article.Furthermore, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) assumes that, on methodological grounds, Skinner rejects all that is not observable, or at least that cannot be operationalized. This, however, is simply incorrect, at least as regards Skinner’s radical behaviorism. As the reader may recall, radical (as opposed to methodological) behaviorism is neither operationalist nor does it reject private or subjective events because of their unobservability. Indeed, Skinner specifically acknowledges that such events are in fact observable—at least for one person: the subject him- or herself. The question for Skinner is to understand how the part of the world that is only observable and experiential for oneself is constructed or formed. In the end, it turns out that radical behaviorism is more radical, in the Aristotelian ontological sense (see Pérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes 2008), than post-modern constructionism. Indeed, as we remarked, radical behaviorism can still surprise us today. Similarly, phenomenology is starting to be missed in the clinical context (Andreasen 2007). We believe that radical behaviorism and phenomenology, mutually readjusted, are in fact excellent wines for the times we live in—if only we knew how to appreciate them.In their commentary on “Phenomenology and behaviorism: A mutual readjustment,” Fletcher and Hayes (2008) argue that the philosophy and theory of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)/Relational Frame Theory (RFT) already contain the salutary aspects of phenomenology that we highlight in our target article. Their insistence on reducing the affinities we find between phenomenology and behaviorism to ACT/RFT consists, in our view, in a scientific–technical argument that is more scientistic than strictly philosophical in nature. Their insistence on the scientific–technical argument itself implies an unclarified philosophical assumption. On what grounds do experimental data constitute the last word? Has... (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of ontological and epistemological models of the transcendent and transcendental in ancient philosophy, which allows us to understand the genesis and foundations of the main variants of metaphysics in classical thought. In general, constructions of ancient Greek thought are characterized by the understanding of the transcendent as "other" being, the higher sphere of the "cosmos of nature", which has specific spatio-temporal properties, which is outside the immanent world of man. Ontological terms, the Cosmos (...) was subdivided into earthly being, in which a man lives, and being "beyond", inaccessible to a man because of his bodily and vital limitations. In epistemological terms the transcendent was considered incomprehensible for sensory cognition, but accessible for cognition of the speculative, although not in full. The metaphysical model of the transcendental created by antiquity did not provide for the existence of an independent "human cosmos" isolated from the external world. The main task of the transcendental method was to determine the conditions by which it is possible to think of the data of empirical observations. (shrink)

Philosophie der Renaissance - Filosofia da Renascença - é o título que leva o volume 13 do Ernst Cassirer Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte [ECN 13], coleção das obras póstumas de Cassirer. O volume traz uma coletânea de textos escritos na década entre 1932 e 1942 nos quais o filósofo retoma e aprofunda teses e interpretações sobre este período da história da filosofia que lhe foi tão caro em toda a sua trajetória intelectual. Cumpre também dizer que com a publicação de (...) ECN 13 a história dos manuscritos de Cassirer e o longo e hercúleo trabalho de sua edição chegam – quase – ao seu fim após pouco mais de um quarto de século de empenho de seus editores e demais envolvidos. (shrink)

Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an alternative conception of “representation” according to which the claim that something is a mere representation does not entail that it is a mere mental item. I offer evidence that Kant does not conceive (...) of representations as mental items and outline an alternative conception of representations. (shrink)

Not only is freedom a shared concern of Sartre and Schelling, which would not be anything particularly unique, but for both philosophers, freedom must be articulated out of an ontological ground, or within the confines of an ontological system. A contradiction nevertheless appears to arise regarding the “orientation” of Sartre and Schelling’s respective “ontologies of freedom”: the freedom of Sartre, reflecting a contemporary stoic-inspired doctrine, is directed toward the future, while for Schelling, with affinities to the temporal logic of psychoanalysis, (...) freedom is oriented toward the past. This article presents both Sartre and Schelling’s ontological reasoning out of which either a progressively oriented freedom (the freedom to negate the present in the name of future “possibles”) or a retrogressively oriented freedom (the freedom to determine the ground of the present out of an indefinite, a-temporal becoming), before attempting to resolve this contradiction in the temporality of freedom by examining the position and role of the negative (of negation, contradiction, or nothingness), as either secondary or primary, within the ontology of each respective philosopher. (shrink)

A strange dialectical reversal characterizes the oppositions which psychoanalysis posits against philosophy and neuroscience: what psychoanalysis intervenes with as a unique and missing quality of these subjects, reveals itself upon enquiry as already having been a feature of said subjects. This article first discusses the failed intervention of psychoanalysis within the perceived totalities and absolutes of German idealism. Psychoanalysis, founded on an ontological division and internal inconsistency with a retroactive logic, finds this internal contradiction already reflected within the supposed totalities (...) of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling’s “blind act,” a decision with no prior foundation that grounds an abstract identity-in-itself, appears as the counterpart to what Badiou calls the strictly “analytic act.” Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which the inconclusive interpenetration of being and nothing presupposes its own conclusion in the transitions to essence, and in which an internal incompleteness and contradiction are retroactively constitutive of the concept, similarly nullifies the intervention of psychoanalysis. Finally, precisely such a reversal is presented in neuroscience, where the constitutive contradiction of contingently functional neuronal formations in the adaptive “multiple demand” model of executive functioning repeats the contingent and self-contradicting psychoanalytic subject as being its own deference within linguistic, discursive formations. (shrink)

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy offers a therapeutic way out of some conundrums stemming from taxonomic expectations regarding philosophical description of experience in general. The paper asks if this is also true of the facts of aesthetic experience. This possibility is hinted at by examining an application of the notion of certainty to aesthetic experience. Some traits of possible uses of central concepts of the mature Wittgenstein to a philosophical aesthetics inspired by the “new method” are also canvassed.

The anthropologist James Frazer investigates the ritual gesture in search of be- liefs about the physical world by the native. Wittgenstein considers this a case of aspect- blindness, one that is disruptive of the conditions for understanding the native’s most triv- ial gestures. Unable to cast his glance from within the native situation, this methodological view from nowhere has an arresting effect on experience – in particular, the experience of speaking. This interruption is to be examined by means of a (...) thought experiment. Then, through the interplay of the concepts of Spirit and Aspect, a philosophical tool is described to assess the problem that can also serve as practical guide back to ordinary experience. The next step is to examine this way out in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual. We conclude by alluding to a pos- sibly mutual illumination between aesthetic experience, translation studies and a Cavellian take on ordinary language. (shrink)

This work begins by proposing the need for exploring the mode of being of mental disorders. It is a philosophical study in an Aristotelian perspective, with special emphasis on the anthropological–cultural dimension. It is difficult for such an inquiry to be carried out from within psychiatry or clinical psychology, committed as these fields are to their own logic and practical conditions. The issues are, in any case, more ontological than strictly clinical in nature. We therefore turn to Aristotle, and specifically (...) his doctrine of the four “causes,” to flesh out the social and cultural dimensions of mental disorders. In accordance with the present analysis, the material cause of disorders would be found in the contingencies of life; the formal cause would pertain primarily to the way clinical conditions themselves can serve as models of ‘being ill’ in our society; the efficient cause would correspond to the patients themselves, understood as active (albeit less than fully conscious) agents as well as to the pharmaceutical industry and the mass media; the final cause would be found in different adaptive functions served by the disorder. We conclude that the “mode of being” of most (if not all) mental disorders—in particular, their status as mental disorders—can often have more to do with cultural forms than with biological factors. (shrink)

La literatura aforística en árabe tuvo una gran importancia tanto antes del Islam como en la época clásica de éste. Numerosos autores recogieron del mundo griego muchos dicta que atribuyeron a los más afamados hombres del saber, pertenecientes a las culturas griega y árabe-musulmana. Los principales filósofos griegos se encontraron entre aquellos a quienes se les asignaron numerosas sentencias. Se ofrece en las páginas que siguen los dicta que en los ‘Uyûn al-anbâ’ se ponen en boca de Aristóteles.The aphoristic literature (...) in Arabic language had a great development as a part of wisdom literature, before and after the Islam. Numerous authors collect from Greek literature many dicta which they ascribed to the most well-known learned men. The main Greek philosophers were among those to whom several aphorisms were assigned. The dicta ascribed to Aristotle in Ibn Abî Usaybiëa’s ‘Uyûn al-anbâ’ are presented in this paper. (shrink)

Con motivo del cincuenta aniversario de la muerte de Miguel Asín Palacios, se pasa revista a su aportación a la historia de la filosofía en el Islam, en especial a la andalusí, a través de un breve análisis de sus principales escritos.On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the distinguished Aragonese arabist Miguel Asín Palacios, the autor reviews in this article the contribution of Asín to the history of Islamic philosophy, especially to the philosophy of Al-Andalus, (...) through a brief analysis of his main writings. (shrink)

En esta ponencia se exponen los diversos caminos de acceso a la Verdad que históricamente se han dado en el Islam: la tradición, la razón y el corazón. Estos dos últimos dan fugar a la filosofía y a fa mís tica. A la vez que se señalan algunas coincidencias entre ellas, también se ponen de relieve las divergencias que las separan.

Conceptual analysis is one of the notions undergoing dramatic changes during Wittgenstein's intermediate period. There's an aspect of such changes which might prove characteristic of the new directions taken by Wittgenstein's thought after 1929: it is the notion of complete analysis. We believe that Wittgenstein's treatment of this notion is also an interesting indication of new concerns generated by the "new method" itself, in terms of its radical openness to dialogism and its anti-dogmatism. Our aim here will be to explore (...) a couple of hints as to why this can be so. (shrink)

Fernández’ most recent book constitutes an articulated development of several philosophical considerations on memory displayed in previous, and forthcoming publications. The result of such articulated development ends up being a consistent account that provides an innovative and thought-provoking perspective on episodic remembering. This volume not only gathers and articulates the author’s previous ideas, but also provides new reflections, and objections that encompasses four significant domains in the philosophy of memory. In the first part of the book, Fernández offers an account (...) of both the metaphysics and the intentionality of episodic memory; in the second part, the author deals with certain phenomenological aspects involved in remembering; in the third part, two important debates in the epistemology of memory are discussed. (shrink)

A pesar de ser una destacada figura del siglo XIX colombiano, la filosofía de José Eusebio Caro (1817-1853) no ha sido sujeto de muchas investigaciones académicas. Las pocas que se han hecho se enfocan sobre todo en sus escritos políticos, su obra de juventud Mecánica social, o su antropología y sus influencias. Sin embargo, el artículo de Andrade González (1967) destaca por sugerir sin evidencias que Caro conoció la filosofía de Schopenhauer durante su exilio en Nueva York. El propósito de (...) este artículo es llevar más lejos dicha sugerencia afirmando que Caro no solo pudo ser el primer filósofo colombiano que hizo una apropiación personal de la filosofía de Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860); sino que incluso pudo ser el primero en tener acceso a las obras del filósofo alemán. A pesar de que no haya evidencia textual directa, se sostiene que hay muchas evidencias textuales indirectas y contextuales para sostener la afirmación. En la primera parte del presente artículo se analizan las primeras, que se fundamentan en las similitudes y diferencias del concepto “vida”presentes en las obras El mundo como voluntad y representación de Schopenhauer y en Meditaciones sobre la ciencia del bien y del mal de Caro. En la segunda parte, se analizan las evidencias contextuales, que se basan en el probable acceso a revista Westminster Review, al igual que a las ediciones americanas de la obra de Schopenhauer. La conclusión plantea que la apropiación de la filosofía schopenhaueriana por parte de Caro tiene implicaciones significativas para la historia de la filosofía en Colombia, pues desafía varios postulados normalizadores que han establecido la narrativa de dicha historia. (shrink)

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been (...) taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument. (shrink)